- Mode
- not yet verified
- Service
- —
- Health-route reads
- —
x402 v2 · Base mainnet · native USDC · read only
Compare x402settlement terms.
Paste a Base transaction hash and caller-declared PaymentRequirements. Canary compares the observable recipient and amount terms with finalized, source-agreed native-USDC evidence. It does not prove x402 wire/version provenance.
- Base mainnet
- Native USDC
- Pinned read-only sources
- No execution authority
What this report can establish
- 01Strict x402 v2 requirement normalization
- 02Fixed-source Base receipt and finality
- 03Native-USDC EIP-3009 payment evidence
- 04Exact recipient and amount comparison
A match establishes only observable recipient and amount alignment. It does not prove x402 provenance, requirement issuance, resource binding, HTTP delivery, business effect, or retry safety.
Building the payment case
Normalizing the requirement and comparing pinned Base observations.
Settlement requirement report
Payment case result
- Case ID
—- Report hash
—- Transaction
—- Observed at
- —
- Receipt
- —
- Finalized anchor
- —
- Source agreement
- —
Requirement alignment
expected ↔ observedObserved payment
payer + nonce are observed onlyx402 wire/version exchange · requirement authenticity or resource binding · expected payer, nonce, or authorization window · timeout compliance · HTTP delivery · business effect · duplicate-purchase status · retry safety.
Verification unavailable
No settlement-terms claim was made. Run the same case again in a moment.
01 / deployment surface
Same-origin status
Read-only status from this deployment. Missing, malformed, or contradictory responses are shown as unverified.
- Release
- not yet verified
- Core
3ead8680d764ecbafe0739865f3789f8928f0fa6- Core suite
- —
- Environment
- —
- Served commit
—- Status checked
- pending
Contacting the two same-origin status routes.
02 / evidence method
Four bounded steps
Normalize the declared requirement, observe fixed Base sources, compare only supported settlement fields, then seal one deterministic no-action report.
-
01
Requirement Normalizer v0.2
implementedStrictly accepts one x402 v2 exact requirement for Base native USDC. Unsupported fields, versions, schemes, assets, and methods fail before RPC.
Emits normalized intent + intentHash -
02
Fixed Base Collector v0.1
implementedRegistry-pinned, read-only Base collection requires a canonical shared finalized anchor and exact native-USDC EIP-3009 event pairing.
Emits source-agreed Base observation -
03
Settlement Comparator v0.2
implementedCompares recipient and atomic amount only after one finalized payment is established. Scheme and timeout remain declared protocol metadata.
Emits exact alignment rows + verdict -
04
Report Seal v0.2
implementedDomain-separated case and report hashes bind normalized inputs to the sanitized response. Hashes identify content; they are not signatures.
Emits unsigned JSON report · no action
03 / verdict contract
Six fail-closed outcomes
The public contract keeps Base evidence, requirement comparison, claim status, and execution authority separate.
| Case | Base evidence | Comparison | Claim made | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 · settlement_terms_matched | confirmed | matched | yes | none |
| 02 · settlement_terms_mismatch | confirmed | mismatched | yes | none |
| 03 · pending_finality | pending_finality | not_evaluated | no | none |
| 04 · not_observed | not_observed | not_evaluated | no | none |
| 05 · multiple_payments_observed | multiple | not_evaluated | no | none |
| 06 · contradiction | contradiction | not_evaluated | no | none |
A mismatch is an evidentiary claim only when one finalized payment exists. Pending,
missing, multiple, and contradictory observations never become a match. Every row
carries actionDirective: none.
04 / assurance boundary
What remains unproven
Settlement alignment is useful only when protocol, authorization, resource, and delivery limits stay attached to every report.
External truth proven
HTTPS authenticates configured RPC endpoints, not Base consensus truth. The unanimous result remains bounded by those operator-declared trust domains.
Requirement authenticity proven
PaymentRequirements is caller-declared. A deterministic intent hash identifies its content but does not prove who issued, signed, or accepted it.
Resource binding proven
A bare PaymentRequirements object does not contain the protected resource URL. The transaction cannot reveal which HTTP resource the payment purchased.
Delivery or business effect proven
Onchain settlement does not establish HTTP delivery, business effect, logical purchase uniqueness, or whether another payment attempt is safe.